What's with a "just war?"
Deeper reflections on militancy in the modern world and in the past
This entry actually will deal with a range of areas I cover on my site: there will be some theology but also some history as well as current events and international affairs involving Russia’s current military actions. I decided it would perhaps be best to place it in the international affairs category, even though theology does play a central role.
A holy war?
The entry is inspired in large part by my reaction to a Newsweek article entitled “Ukraine Is Now ‘Holy War',’ Russian Church Declares.” Oddly enough I ran across the article, not by reading Newsweek, but because I heard a clergyman who seemed in apparent agreement with the sentiment of the article, reading aloud from it (or something very like it) at a social gathering in our church hall. Certain others in the hall at the time seemed to share his apparent outrage at the “Russian chauvinism” (a phrase the clergyman used) the article was describing.
According to the article’s author, one Brendan Cole, a document produced and published by an organization called the World Russian People’s Council (WRPC hereafter) proves that “the Russian Orthodox Church . . . deems President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine a ‘Holy War.’”1 Holy War is, indeed, one possible translation of the target phrase, but there are other choices as well. I have translated the phrase slightly differently in the full translation of the WRPC document I posted here.
Reading the article, I believe that part of the rationale that led the author to favor and accentuate the phrase “holy war” is because of its resonance in current western culture. Since the events of 9/11, that phrase has been associated mostly with Islamist extremists bent on implementing domination of the world by an anticipated end-time Islamic regime, thus bringing about some sort of eschatological vision many of those engaging in such holy wars maintain lies at the successful issue of their project. As such, we westerners tend to think of any undertaking being executed under that moniker as a crazed enterprise being implemented by imbalanced psyches aimed at subjecting the world’s populace to the imposition of Sharia law administered by Wahabist judges. And perhaps Brendan Cole views Russia’s actions in the conflict underway in Ukraine as operating along similar lines: such a stance comports well with the western press’ depiction of Putin as a crazed modern-day Hitler bent on reconstituting the former Soviet Union and with hopes of extending the influence of his diabolical regime across Europe and beyond.
Proper contextualization
But we need not follow Cole’s lead for several good reasons. First and foremost we have the option of recognizing the simple and obvious fact that Russia, in conducting military operations in Ukraine, is actually reacting to a years’ long provocation campaign conducted by western powers, spearheaded by the U.S., that seeks to expand a hostile military alliance (NATO) right up to its borders. That Russia would take military action in response to the most recent escalations in this provocation campaign was entirely predictable simply by looking at Putin’s repeated warnings over the course of more than a decade as to what would be the result, should NATO expansion toward Russia’s borders continue to be pursued. In fact, perspicacious commentators such as Dr. John Mearsheimer have been warning westerners for years as to what would be the likely result of such continued provocation.2
The other sound reason for not following Cole’s lead in viewing the content of the WRPC document as of one species with Islamic extremist holy wars is because western history is rife with many of its own “holy wars.” Though some of these may have been conducted more impulsively than others, many were wars that were waged after examination of the circumstances and deliberation on the question of whether the infliction of suffering and death caused by war would be outweighed by the suffering and death that would be likely to result should military action not be taken. I allude here to what is sometimes referred to in the West as “just war theory.”
Anyone who has taken basic courses in ethics or has contemplated taking extreme action in the face of some threat will be familiar with the basic principles. Scenarios such as happening to turn one’s car down a street and seeing a gunman firing into a crowd come to mind: should one use their car to run down the gunman, risking killing him and possibly someone near him in order to neutralize the threat to the crowd of people being fired upon? When, in addition to basic humanitarian concerns, the dictates of the Christian faith come into play, is where we start to get into the territory of formulations that fall under the heading “just war theory.”
“Just war:” what is it? Its expression in the West
Ideas along such lines began to be contemplated at least as early as the time of Augustine of Hippo (4th-5th centuries: see for example his Reply to Faustus the Manichean, XXIL, 74 and ff. and his City of God). He lived during a time when Christianity was beginning to pervade all social strata of the Empire, up to and including the ruling classes. In short, the Western (and Eastern) world were on the brink of seeing a scenario in which a close, if not intimate, alliance was forming between administrators of institutions representing the newly ascendant faith of Christianity and the political rulers of the Empire.
This scenario, so different from the earlier days of Christianity wherein the faithful were a persecuted minority often bereft of virtually any temporal authority, posed new challenges for the faith. Empires this side of the eschaton always have, and always will, wage wars. Yet the persecuted faith adhered to by the lower-class early Christians and that is evidenced in the accounts contained in the New Testament seems not to envision or be predicated upon a scenario in which the ruler of a nation might struggle with the applicability of such dictates as turning the other cheek or whose professional armies might be dismissed as living by the sword and therefore dying by the sword.
But many of the new Christians, such as Augustine, would rise to the challenge, grappling with the question of under what circumstances an army representing an empire whose populace—including leaders at the highest levels as well as military officers and soldiers of all ranks—was predominantly Christian, might engage in warfare. The gist of the just war theories developed by these figures over the centuries is that war is a necessary evil, but one that may be considered as a last resort.
Although this sort of theorizing was more highly developed and systematized in Western Christianity, it was also being adopted in more informal and ad hoc ways in Eastern Christian circles as well. There were even instances wherein the Western half of the Empire waged war on the Eastern half, undoubtedly having justified military action to themselves, as in the Sack of Constantinople which occurred during the 4th crusade. In fact, the justification of wars of various sorts, both just and unjust according to our modern sensibilities, has become part and parcel of our Christian patrimony.
In many Western democracies, with their explicit attempts to separate ecclesiastical and civil powers, we tend to think of these sort of justifications for war as a relic of our primitive past. In actual fact, Western leaders still undoubtedly consult spiritual authorities—though privately—regarding their intentions to conduct one or another military action. I highly doubt that, for example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s D-Day prayer was composed without input from high-ranking Christian leaders. George H. W. Bush evidently consulted with Billy Graham prior to launching the Persian Gulf War,3 and Graham appears to have been a sort of spiritual adviser to a number of American presidents.
The situation in the East
Meanwhile in the East, there remain several countries whose populations are predominantly Christian, many of whose political leaders, also present themselves as adherents to the faith. Greece, Romania, and Serbia are among such countries where leaders of the majority faith in the country, Eastern Orthodoxy, can have close ties with the government. Some of these countries, like Russia, went through a period during which the influence of the Church on, not just politicians, but society in general, was minimized and attempts were even made to exclude it from exercising any influence whatever. Those attempts failed, and the churches in those countries are reviving, often now having an impact even on high government officials.
This describes the situation in Russia, where the president promotes an image of himself as an adherent to Orthodox Christianity and where the highest-ranking clergyman, the Patriarch, (Kirill, at present) plays a visible advisory role, rubbing shoulders with him and other politicians at the highest levels of government. This situation presents something of a return to the state of affairs in imperial Russia, when there were close relations between the state and the ecclesiastical administration representing the bulk of the nation’s faithful. The advisory role of Kirill, then, is of a similar character to the one that obtained throughout much of the course of Christian history in Russia and other countries, the majority of whose populace are adherents of the Orthodox faith: close relations and often cooperation between church and state officials. Under such circumstances governmental representatives sometimes seek spiritual guidance from ecclesiastical representatives on planned actions, with at other times, government forces compelling cooperation from the church. Not to mention instances in which church officials begin meddling in political affairs.
In any case, this is the appropriate context within which phrases like “holy war” or “sacred war” are to be interpreted. What is in view is that ecclesiastical figures have reviewed the circumstances of the conflict and have rendered judgement as to whether the Christian prohibition against the taking of life that is likely to result and the suffering and misery that could ensue during the intended military action, outweighs the loss of life and social turmoil and hardship likely to result from not taking military action in a given instance. We may not agree with the conclusions of the ecclesiastical leaders making such decisions, but we should at least recognize the processes they have followed and pay some regard to their rationale in doing so.
Western misperceptions
But this is precisely what Brendan Cole and the majority of western observers are not doing. I believe they refuse to do so as a result of their acceptance of the false premise they presume and insist on promoting: that Vladimir Putin is a crazed autocrat bent on reconstituting the former Soviet state and with threatening democracies the world over. Not a moment’s pause is taken by such people over the question of whether legitimate security concerns might form the source of Russia’s actions; that notwithstanding years of warnings from Putin and Russia about the dangers inherent in the expansion of NATO, a hostile military alliance, ever closer to their borders—despite promises made to the contrary by Western leaders when the Soviet Union collapsed; and despite repeated warnings that Russia would need to consider military options, should the trend of provocations continue. Never, evidently, does the question of Western provocation as a precipitating factor for the conflict enter their minds. And just as these Western commentators and leaders will not recognize the validity of the security concerns Russia repeatedly voiced, so they will not consider the conclusions of ecclesiastical figures who may have advised that taking military action in Ukraine would be a cause that could be justified.
Statements such as “While recognising war as evil, the Church does not prohibit her children from participating in hostilities if at stake is the security of their neighbours and the restoration of trampled justice. Then war is considered to be necessary though undesirable . . . means,”4 if found by the Western commentators under discussion, will be dismissed as rubber-stamping by ecclesiastical authorities of the autocrat’s warped will. There is apparently no question in their minds as to whether the security of neighbors (residents of Donbas and others living within the territory of modern-day Ukraine who see themselves as more culturally and linguistically affiliated with Moscow and its present regime than with Kiev and its regime and for this reason suffered a yearslong assault at the hands of the Ukrainian military) is threatened, let alone whether there is any trampled justice that needs to be restored in the area. No, to them—keen supporters of Western political rhetoric that tacitly grants “democratic” status to regimes such as Saudi Arabia’s Islamic, Wahabist theocracy or Israel’s Jewish theocracy—a supposed fledgling democracy in Ukraine is being crushed by a powerful and menacing neighbor with a deranged, dictatorial leader. They seem to exercise a similar willful blindness when it comes to recognizing the fingerprints of western security operatives (C.I.A. and MI6) in pre-2022 Ukraine, that sought to foment and exacerbate anti-Russian sentiment in the years leading up to the current conflict.
It is not difficult to imagine a dialogue such as the following taking place between Putin and Patriarch Kirill prior to February 2022: (Putin might ask) “I am faced, due to repeated provocations from the West via their proxies in Ukraine, with the prospect of taking military action to address this threat: does our church have any guidance in this matter?” (Kirill might answer) “Our Church takes the following stance on such matters: She does not prohibit her children from participating in hostilities if at stake is the security of their neighbours and the restoration of trampled justice. Then war is considered to be necessary though undesirable . . . means.” Can such a scenario be depicted as the Russian church declaring the war to be a just one and thus ascribing to a just war theory? It seems one that might have been voiced in any period of history by ecclesiastical officials to any ruler of any country, a majority of whose citizens were of the Orthodox faith, who might have sought advice from those learned in the faith when contemplating military action.5 In fact, I believe this to have been a regular occurrence throughout Orthodox history, and it is one that continues into the present even in countries that have official policies aimed at separating church and state relations, as alluded to above. If this sort of thing is not a just war theory, then it is, at the least, a just war theory in gestation.6
While we do not have here highly extrapolated doctrinal statements regarding just wars, we undoubtedly do have a situation in which leading churchmen make judgments as to whether military actions can be justified from the point of view of their faith. And we may very well have them, when queried, offering their advice on the matter to political leaders. Not a full blown just war theory such as is seen in Western sources, but one with all the same basic ingredients and functioning along similar lines, though in the absence of detailed formal proclamations.
The WRPC
It will be worthwhile to pause here momentarily to consider just what sort of organization the WRPC actually is. It should be noted first and foremost that, although Patriarch Kirill, currently the highest ranking clergyman in the Russian Orthodox Church, seems to have participated in the founding of this organization in 1993 (16 years prior to his elevation to his current rank), the WRPC is actually a para-church organization. Although its ranks include clergymen, it includes many more lay members than clergy. As such, it is neither the formulator nor the purveyor of the doctrinal stances of the Russian Church. About the most that might be said in this regard is that it can be assumed, since Patriarch Kirill presides over the organization, that it is likely that views on the matters addressed in the document are in accord with his own personal views. But since the office of patriarch in Orthodox circles differs sharply in terms of authority from that of the Pope in the western church, it would be mistaken to assume that those views somehow automatically become those of the Russian Orthodox Church at large. So while the content of the document likely accurately reflects the views of Russian participants and the personal sentiments of clergymen involved, the document is being falsely depicted in the Western press as representing a formal declaration of the Russian Orthodox Church.
The political calculus
As to the justness of the cause behind the conflict, this seems to me a rather easy judgment call from the perspective of international relations and political strategy. Any nation with sufficient military resources that was being subjected to the sorts of provocations waged against Russia over the last couple odd decades could be expected to react in a similar fashion. Nations, when threatened militarily, react using military force: the historical record is rife with examples.
Lloyd Austin’s proclamation in spring of 2022 to the effect that “we want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine” is wrongly understood in the West as a reaction against the February invasion. To the contrary, this was not something that he and his cohorts came up with subsequent to February of 2022, but was in reality the unspoken policy of the U.S. and its NATO minions from long before Russia ever took any concrete military actions toward Ukraine. In fact, weakening Russia, or maintaining it in its already-enfeebled state, was the aim of many U.S. policy makers throughout and in the wake of the disaster of the Yeltsin administration.
This is partly because so many in our government are keen to maintain the U.S. hegemony on the world’s political scene that was attained with the collapse of the Soviet Union. With that development, the world no longer had two superpowers, but only one—something John Mearsheimer has dubbed the “unipolar moment.” This is part of the reason why many in high office in our country would like to see Putin ousted from office: because he is a strong nationalist who wishes to create unity within his borders and to see his country restored to what he views as its rightful place on the world stage, i.e., among the leading powers of the world. So many in leadership in the U.S. and the West in general are desperate to prevent that from happening and are scheming up ways to, at the least, hobble the Putin administration, and at most to drive him from power in disgrace.
Their goal seems to me to be to initiate a “balkanization” in Russia, i.e., to cause the country to split into warring factions and thus to make the region more amenable to western political machinations.7 Another bounty many westerners likely see in such a dissolution of Russia is the opening up of its vast store of natural resources to exploitation by western financial concerns. I personally am convinced that these are the real reasons behind the West’s provocation campaigns in the region. Retired Lt. Colonel Tony Shaffer’s theory about the impetus behind the West’s actions in instigating the 2014 Maidan revolution as having to do with a 2013 “massive” discovery of oil in the Donbas and the Black Sea, and the subsequent lengthy series of provocations staged by Ukraine at the urging of its western backers, provides compelling circumstantial evidence from a former insider as to the sorts of motivations behind the actions of western powers via their Ukrainian proxies.8 Thankfully, their malign manipulations seem to be failing.
Christian calculus
But that is an assessment of matters that accounts for the political and economic strategies of those involved. It takes no account of the human element, of the nearly incalculable suffering inflicted on lives and landscape of the people and areas involved. Figures for the numbers of dead and wounded soldiers directly involved in combat on the two sides are disputed, but whatever the actual numbers turn out to be, thousands of young men on both sides have either lost their lives or been left with life-altering injuries, with their families and friends being impacted by the tragedy as well. If some of the numbers turn out to be accurate it appears that Ukraine has lost nearly an entire generation of young men.
And this is where the Christian ethos is meant to be operative, in making some sense of a tragedy that is difficult or impossible to comprehend in its full scope, or at least in offering solace to those affected. If mercy and sympathy are the appropriate responses of the Christian to the sufferings of humanity, appearances indicate that the Ukrainian side of the conflict is more deserving since so many more lives seem to have been impacted than on the Russian side. But tragedy has visited both sides and mercy and compassion, which for mortals are finite and something to be parceled out, for the God in Whom Christians believe, there are infinite amounts sufficient for every being and situation in the universe. To the extent that Christians take either side in this conflict they must be prepared to show mercy and compassion in accord with the plenitude of the God in Whom they believe; not just to those who share their own views and motivations, but to those who differ or even take an opposing stance as well.
It seems obvious that, had Russia not initiated military action, thousands of lives would not have been lost or been adversely impacted in the region. On this note, some would make the point that the initial military incursion achieved the second most desirable aim from the Russian side, with little to no bloodshed: forcing Ukraine to the negotiating table, setting the stage for a potential agreement regarding neutrality with respect to NATO and implementation of the so-called Minsk Accords.9 It now appears that, in fact, an agreement had been reached and that the withdrawal of Russian troops in April 2022 was effected as a gesture of good faith in the negotiation process. But the West, evidently at the insistence of the U.S. and Britain (Boris Johnson seems to have been the purveyor), appears to have assured the Zelenskiy regime that engaging in a military confrontation would be desirable and that, with western backing, the Ukrainians would be sure to prevail.
This series of events, then, is what has led to the nearly incalculable tragedy that has ensued in the region. The scenario that evokes our Christian sympathies for the suffering transpiring there should not prevent us from judging where primary fault lies in the precipitation of this catastrophe. Yes, Russia is the proximate cause inasmuch as their military is operative and seems to be maintaining the upper hand in the fighting. At the same time, we must take stock of the fact that all indications are that the Russian side has been willing to engage at all points in this conflict in negotiations.
Though Ukraine that has outlawed negotiations, making such negotiations contingent on a full Russian withdrawal from areas they have taken (liberated, in their view) by force, it is ultimately the U.S. and other western backers intent on weakening Russia that are behind a position that excludes the possibility of agreeing to a settlement. These are the same forces that sabotaged the initial agreement reached in April of 2022 and whose representatives, such as Lindsey Graham, seem to revel in the deaths of Russians.10 It is the “just war theories” of this crowd who arrogate to themselves the role of king-makers, crafters of history, and who aspire to become the puppeteers animating the world’s statecraft. These are the ones who deserve the main blame and condemnation for the catastrophe unfolding in this, as in other regions of the world. Our Christian sympathy for the sufferers and our desire to end the conflict and achieve a just peace must not be allowed to obscure our understanding of why events have transpired in the way they have in the current conflict.
Comments on certain western peace advocates
As for those western Orthodox Christians currently styling themselves advocates for peace—which, of course, most who are not in positions of power want—I find myself wondering where they were in the lead-up to this conflict? Is advocating for peace largely a matter of condemning the alleged “bully” in a given conflict? Sadly, that seems to be the tack many take. But bringing about peace should involve much more than this. It should involve, for example, attempts at deconfliction before any hostilities become active warfare situations. Just as, were one witnessing two individuals on the verge of fisticuffs, one could always try to deescalate the situation by engaging the parties in dialog or using some other diversionary strategy, so groups advocating for peace should not only issue condemnations of one side or the other after active fighting breaks out, but should take some action beforehand to help defuse the situation.
Leading up to the current conflict, as mentioned previously in this article, there were a series of western provocations that were gradually increasing tensions, thus heightening the possibility that a military confrontation might occur. Did any of those now advocating for peace, for example, ever point out that these were occurring and warn that the probability of a military conflict was therefore heightening? Did they not understand that such actions are likely to increase tensions, and therefore to make physical confrontation more likely? If one is really advocating for peace, should not one be at least as focused on what sorts of conditions lead to the outbreak of physical violence and on efforts at addressing those, as on issuing condemnations after physical violence has erupted?
With regard to the current conflict, for example, where were the warnings from, say, Orthodox Peace Fellowship, that the U.S. insistence on bringing Ukraine into NATO was heightening tensions between Russia and Ukraine and could bring about, based on Putin’s repeated warnings, open warfare? Again, where were the articles decrying the role of Western powers in the Maidan coup that led to the ouster of a democratically-elected president, which so obviously led to violence against Ukrainian citizens who had favored close ties and cooperation with Russia? Were there any such articles warning that such activities were a threat to peace in the region? If so, I cannot find them. Further, were any articles written warning that equipping and arming a NATO military in Ukraine could be likely to exacerbate tensions with its neighbor, and so increase the likelihood of open warfare?
And what of the violence that preceded the current conflict, which saw the NATO-backed and supplied Ukrainian army attacking regions of the country whose citizenry objected to being forced to use the Ukrainian language and to identify with a culture they considered foreign to their own heritage?11 Where were the articles condemning the violence and warning that such activities were stoking hatred that could issue in a larger and more damaging war? Peace advocates: did you take notice, issue warnings, and make efforts at deconfliction in response to these realities? If not, what sort of “peace” did you expect to ensue? One in which all simply capitulate to U.S. interests, regardless of how unjust they might perceive its actions to be?
Were any of these current peace advocates reluctant to speak out on such issues as militarization of Ukraine and Ukrainian military attacks on Russian-sympathetic Ukrainian citizens for fear of being depicted as “Putin stooges” in the West? And if so, what does that say about western perceptions regarding events leading up to the outbreak of war in the region and how those influenced those who now present themselves as advocating for peace? Does this not rather indicate that they are being manipulated by western powers who appear, after all, just as militant—if not more so—than any Russian leader?
In light of such questions, it seems to me such so-called advocates for peace in relation to the current conflict are acting in a cowardly way and taking the easy way out, looking for cheap and quick answers to the vexing problems associated with the outbreak of violence. Seriously advocating for peace involves far more than just issuing boiler-plate condemnations of the side in a conflict that is being portrayed in the popular western press as the bad guy. Far more important where peace is being pursued is the identification of tension-exacerbators, bringing them to the attention of the world at large, and issuing warnings about the potential for physical violence and the outbreak of open warfare. From the perspective of bringing about actual peace in the world, the sorts of rubber-stampings of popular narratives about the “bad actor” in the conflict such as we see currently appear as merely cheap shots, lazy answers to the problem of violence in the world and impotent to stem the genesis or spread of conflict.
Священная Bойна/Sviaschennaya Voyna in recent history
In closing, a word about the phrase священная война/sviaschennaya voyna. One might expect, if anywhere in Russian history, to find such a phrase being used during the time of Imperial Russia, say, in connection with Russia’s entry into WWI or perhaps in response to the Napoleonic invasion of the early nineteenth century. But, oddly enough, the phrase seems to have become a meme in Russian society during the Soviet period, in connection with the Nazi invasion during WW2.
A popular patriotic song entitled Священная Война/Sviaschennaya Voyna was released in June of 1941, with the obvious aim of rallying the Soviet citizenry against the Nazi invasion that began that same month. Stalin’s strategy for heightening morale in order to counter the Nazi threat, a known aspect of which was allowing some churches to reopen, introduces the possibility that permitting public use of phrases such as “sacred war,” which doubtless evoked sentiments the Soviet state had been suppressing militantly for over a decade, was part and parcel of the same effort. As the case may be, this phrase became a part of the Russian lexicon and has been associated with love of country and with patriotism ever since. The fact that Russia depicts itself as once again engaging in a struggle with Nazi ideology in Ukraine, is doubtless germane to the use of the phrase in the current context, including in the WRPC document, as well.
Though some doubts were raised, subsequent to the fall of the Soviet Union regarding the authorship of the song Священная Война/Sviaschennaya Voyna and the musical notation for the piece was subsequently shown to date to a period prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, the lyrics clearly relate to the Nazi threat of the early 1940’s. In fact, an original draft of the lyrics in the author’s hand has been found in a Russian archive.12
The full citation from the document, in Russian, is “С духовно-нравственной точки зрения специальная военная операция является Священной войной” (“From a spiritual and moral point of view, the special military operation is a Sacred War” [my translation]). I have rendered “sacred war” rather than Newsweek’s/Google translate’s “holy war” for reasons that should become evident in reading this article.
Mearsheimer’s 2015 lecture entitled “Why is Ukraine the West's Fault?” provides an example. It can be viewed here.
See Graham’s obituary at https://apnews.com/united-states-government-cff1c43d52d04f1e8ab56ee776c6ee48.
Excerpted from section VIII., War and peace, in an official document of the Russian Orthodox Church entitled The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church that was “Adopted at the Sacred Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church” and that “sets forth the basic provisions of her teaching on church-state relations and a number of problems socially significant today.” The excerpt from section VIII cited above can be found at https://old.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/viii/.
It seems quite in keeping with St. Basil’s (4th century) assertion that “Homicide in war is not reckoned by our Fathers as homicide; I presume from their wish to make concession to men fighting on behalf of chastity and true religion. Perhaps, however, it is well to counsel that those whose hands are not clean only abstain from communion for three years” (from his Letter to Amphilocius, included as canon 13 among the Canons of the Holy Fathers that form one section of the Orthodox Church’s canonical corpus)
I respectfully diverge from the views of Fr. Stanley Harakas on this matter, whose acquaintance I made some decades ago, having audited one session of an ethics course he was teaching at the time. If the discussion is about whether there exists any carefully crafted document specifically addressing the circumstances under which military action is permitted in Eastern tradition, he is technically correct in saying there is no just war theory in Orthodox tradition or sources. If, on the other hand, the discussion concerns whether any ruler of any majority-Orthodox country, during the course of the last couple of millennia, ever consulted with ecclesiastical authorities about the advisability, with regard to church teachings and doctrines, of conducting a military campaign, I believe he is quite wrong. On the contrary, I hold that this latter was likely a routine occurrence. Any such ecclesiastical figure(s) who may have advised that military action could be reconciled with church teachings would have been, in effect, confirming that the action was just or justified.
I obviously have in mind here what happened to the former Yugoslavia subsequent to NATO’s bombing of Serbia, the intent of which, I believe, was precisely to divide the area’s populace into warring factions more susceptible to western control and exploitation.
March 7th, 2024 interview on The Duran youtube channel. Shaffer’s remarks on this point in particular occur at about the 38 minute mark.
The first most desirable outcome from the Russian side seems to have been that Ukraine would actually implement the Minsk Accords and agree to neutrality with respect to NATO through diplomatic means rather than under threat of military action.
His comments in a meeting with Zelenskiy in Kiev in May of 2023.
See my March 2022 article On the sacrosanctity of Ukraine’s current borders for a bit of a primer on how far back into history the current conflict’s roots lie. Hint: it substantially predates the Bolshevik Revolution.