Who are the Russian "saboteurs" and what is their fate?

The events unfolding in Ukraine provide us with the opportunity to once again take to heart the lessons of war and the role this phenomenon plays in the human psyche and in society as a whole. Having no sort of Slavic ethnic heritage and having been born and reared in America, yet having acquired a good facility in Russian language and culture, I hold that I am in a good position to outline some of those lessons. Since my spouse of many years is Russian, I now also have family in that country, as well as many good friends. I likewise have close friends from Ukraine, most now living in the U.S.

I hope in a subsequent article to get to the question of why our leaders, both American and Russian, like war. But in this article I wish to deal with another, related concern. It is one on which I have seen no coverage in Western media. It regards what we refer to here in reference to the current Ukrainian context as "Russian saboteurs." I have yet to see it asked anywhere just who these people are and what fate is befalling them.

The facile assumption which most--both professional journalists and average citizens alike--westerners seem to make is that the saboteurs being hunted down by Ukrainian military forces are Russian military or government operatives who accompanied the Russian army in connection with their recent incursion into Ukraine. Such fellow Slavs, sharing a closely related language and similar customs to those of Ukrainians, could blend in easily with the Ukrainian populace and cause havoc behind enemy lines. Militaries are well known to deploy such tactics and the Russian military in the present circumstance could well be doing so.

But such simplistic assumptions about what is occurring are dangerous for the following reasons. To begin with, a substantial minority of the populace in Ukraine are Russian-language speakers. This minority tends to be a much greater proportion of the populace in the eastern half of the country, but Russian-language speakers can be found in some proportion throughout the country. Further, not all Ukrainian citizens prior to the invasion were opposed to cultivating close relations with Russia: such a sentiment would likely have been more prevalent in the eastern half of the country than in the west, but there is no doubt that it existed. Witness the election of Viktor Yanukovich in what the West deemed a free and fair election, a pro-Russia Ukrainian politician, to the Ukrainian presidency in 2010.

As a fan of the sport of boxing, I would give as prominent examples of the language situation in Ukraine the great lower-weight boxing champion Vasyl Lomachenko (from Akkerman in the southwest of Ukraine, near Odessa) and current heavyweight champion Alexander Usyk (from Crimea). Both are very nationalistic and carry the Ukrainian flag on their ring walks. And both have now returned to Ukraine to participate on the side of the defending Ukrainian government and military.

Having watched nearly all these boxers' matches and listened to their post-fight interviews, it is clear to me that they are Russian speakers. Perhaps they also have good facility in the Ukrainian language: I cannot say, since I've never heard them speak it. But having spoken Russian with many Russian natives over the course of the last few decades, I hear in the speech of these boxers the same patterns and fluency I hear among native Russian speakers in Russia. It should not go unnoticed by westerners, then, that when these boxers offer their post-fight remarks, they use the Russian language, not the Ukrainian language.

The question needing to be asked in light of this is why is this? Is it because boxing promotions cannot find or afford to hire Ukrainian speakers with English facility as in-ring spontaneous translators? Or is it because these boxers are far more fluent in and comfortable with Russian language than with Ukrainian? It defies belief that boxing promotions would be unable to find or hire Ukrainian/English translators, should that be the language in which they have better facility. Rather, it is more likely a matter of choice: these boxers use in their in-ring interviews, the language in which they feel most comfortable conversing. That language is Russian. The fact that discussions in their corners with their trainers between rounds as well as instructions being shouted by these trainers from outside the ring during the course of the fight are also in Russian is also indicative that their preferred language is Russian.

I encountered another relevant instance in the U.S. a number of years ago. A local community college in a rural area of Wisconsin was trying to cultivate close relations with educators in Ukraine and had invited a delegation to come and visit them. For the visitors, the college had hired a translator from Chicago who was fluent in English and Ukrainian. Some of the members of the delegation were complaining privately to me that they could not understand the translator and wished the college had provided a Russian translation. Again, these were citizens of Ukraine who had much better fluency in Russian language than in Ukrainian.

With regard to the question of the saboteurs and their treatment, a recent story from the British tabloid The Sun contains important data (https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/17899587/ukraine-war-russia-british-fighter/). The story offers an account of a young British ex-army medic, Jason Haigh, who went to Ukraine to serve on behalf of the Ukrainian military. He recounts some harrowing moments in the early days of the invasion in the initial military confrontations. Not long after the start of warfare Jason and an American comrade were arrested, not by the Russian army, but by "Ukraine agents looking for Russian saboteurs." Afterward, as the story tells us, the two "were taken to a security service base and interrogated for three hours." Jason recounts "my head was slammed down by one of the guards. A different guy came in and I could tell by his kit that he was in an elite unit. He had cable ties and two hoods and I thought 'S***, this is real.' They kept shouting Russian at me but obviously I said I was English. They whacked me around eight or nine times. I had quite a bad concussion and was bleeding heavily. They looked at my phone and my messages which was a really scary moment." Jason was finally freed and left Ukraine shortly afterward, presumably for medical treatment.

I have no desire to engage in military warfare either for or against the Ukrainian military or citizenry, though I have considered trying to work in some humanitarian aid capacity in the region. But in light of this I have to wonder, had I gone there and been captured by Ukrainian forces, what would have become of me? Is comprehension of Russian language the main criterion on which the decision is being made as to whether one is a saboteur? Despite the fact that I would be able to comprehend and respond to the Russian speech being shouted at me, since I would presumably have with me an American passport would I, like Jason Haigh, get off with just a severe beating?

But what about citizens of Ukraine who are Russian speakers and do not have American passports? What are the criteria according to which they are adjudged guilty or innocent of sabotage? Well known figures such as Vasyl Lomachenko and Alexander Usyk obviously have nothing to worry about, but what of average Ukrainian citizens?

It is a normal reaction to decry the humanitarian abuses of the aggressor in wartime contexts, in this case most immediately Russia. But, given the case of Jason Haigh, we must also entertain the possibility that humanitarian abuses are being committed by the Ukrainians as well. The lesson of The Sun piece suggests that there is a good possibility that any Russian-speaker currently in Ukraine--high profile figures such as Vasyl Lomachenko and Alexander Usyk excepted--is a potential suspect. Why no one in the western press has asked simple questions of the Ukrainians such as "on what basis is guilt being determined in the case of these suspected saboteurs?" and, even more importantly, "what is the penalty for someone presumed guilty?" is a stain on western media practices.

From the Jason Haigh case it seems that the lightest punishment a suspected saboteur might get would be torture--and that if one is determined in the course of the "investigation" to be innocent. And the severest punishment for those deemed guilty? Is it imprisonment? Summary execution? Anyone who cannot see in these circumstances the potential for something along the lines of ethnic cleansing is being willfully ignorant. Especially when it comes to Russian-language citizens of Ukraine who have been critical of their government, or those who might previously have been in favor of cultivating closer relations with Russia. Presumably such are in the minority. But how small does a minority have to be before the west becomes concerned about their plight?

American media have long since abdicated their responsibilities on this matter. It is left to outlets like Substack and its readers to ask honest questions about it and to ponder the implications.

J.M. 3/10/22